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FOREWORD
An overview of changing U.S. Central Asia policy
over the past 5 years reveals an effort to respond to
changing developments on the ground, most recently
the Georgian crisis, but also the “color” revolutions,
the Andijan events in Uzbekistan and its subsequent
decision to end U.S. basing rights at Karshi Khanabad,
Kazakhstan’s economic rise, and leadership change in
Turkmenistan. At the same time, the worsening security
situation in Afghanistan and growing insecurity about
energy supplies has heightened U.S. interest in security
and economic cooperation in Central Asia.
Russia and China have been reacting to these same
pressures as the United States. In response to the
“color” revolutions, they achieved broad agreement
on the priority of regime security and the need to limit
the long-term military presence of the United States in
Central Asia. These are also two key areas—defining
the political path of Central Asian states and securing
a strategic foothold in the region—where the United
States finds itself in competition with Russia and
China.
Nonetheless, the Russia-China partnership should
not be seen as an anti-U.S. bloc, nor should the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) be viewed
as entirely cohesive. Although there is considerable
suspicion of U.S. designs on Central Asia, divergent
interests within the SCO, among Central Asian states,
and especially between Russia and China serve to limit
any coordinated anti-U.S. activity.
Despite the fissures within the SCO and the
competitive tendencies within the Sino-Russian
partnership, the United States will not have an easy
time achieving its aims in Central Asia. Building on her
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previous Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs,
Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia (2002)
and Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security
Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (2004), Dr. Elizabeth
Wishnick documents how American policy goals—
energy cooperation, regional security, and support
for democracy and the rule of law—continue to run at
cross-purposes with one another.
In particular, she asserts that competition to
secure basing arrangements and energy contracts
only benefits authoritarian regimes at the expense of
enduring regional security. She argues further that
the rhetoric about a new Cold War in the aftermath of
the Georgian crisis, and the more general tendency to
view U.S.-Russia-China competition in the region with
19th century lenses, as some sort of “new great game,”
obscures the common interests the great powers share
in addressing transnational problems in Central Asia.
		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph explores the appearance and reality
of a consolidation of anti-U.S. interests in Central Asia
via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and
the Sino-Russian partnership. The author asserts that
while there is considerable suspicion of U.S. designs
on Central Asia, divergent interests within the SCO,
among Central Asian states, and especially between
Russia and China, serve to limit any coordinated antiU.S. activity.
The monograph takes a critical look at the SinoRussian partnership and points to differences on energy
and economic integration in Central Asia, despite
common interests in maintaining regime security
and limiting U.S. influence in the region. A section
on the implications of the Georgian crisis shows how
this war highlighted the divergence in Russian and
Chinese interests, while accentuating the vulnerability
of the Central Asian states to Russian influence, and
underlining the risks involved in U.S. energy projects
in the region.
The monograph then addresses the policy
implications for the United States of the shifting
regional picture in Central Asia. Despite the fissures
within the SCO and the competitive tendencies within
the Sino-Russian partnership, the monograph asserts
that United States will not have an easy time achieving
its aims in Central Asia. American policy goals—
energy cooperation, regional security, and support for
democracy and the rule of law—often conflict with one
another. Declining assistance also leaves the United
States with fewer effective policy instruments to recoup
its declining influence among Central Asian publics,
address underlying conditions which lead to regional
instability, and press for accountable governments
vi

that have the capacity to address the growing range of
transnational threats to the region. The author presents
policy recommendations in a concluding section. She
notes that, despite the general tendency to highlight the
clashing interests among the great powers in Central
Asia, the United States also faces many opportunities
for multilateral cooperation due the increasing primacy
of transnational threats.
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RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES
IN CENTRAL ASIA:
PROSPECTS FOR GREAT POWER COMPETITION
AND COOPERATION
IN THE SHADOW OF THE GEORGIAN CRISIS
Introduction.
The United States is facing an increasingly
challenging strategic picture in Central Asia. The
tensions in Russia-Georgia relations which had been
building in 2008 erupted into a war in early August,
involving disproportionate use of force by Russia in its
intervention in Georgian territory allegedly to protect
Russian and South Ossetian civilians from Georgian
shelling. According to the terms of an agreement brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Russia’s
forces pulled back from uncontested Georgian territory
by October 10, 2008, but 7,600 Russian troops remain
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which Moscow
recognized as independent on August 26.
The Georgian crisis has had far-reaching implications for U.S.-China-Russia relations in Central Asia.
One obvious consequence was a ratcheting up of rhetoric by Russian and American policymakers, leading
some observers to speculate about a new Cold War. Due
to the integrated nature of the global economy, however, Russia cannot afford to isolate itself, and the
United States and the European Union (EU) need to
work with Russia to address a range of important
economic, political, and security issues. Once the
Medvedev government complies with international
agreements on Georgia, the resumption of dialogue
with Russia will be all the more important for global
security. Moreover, this monograph argues here that
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Russian actions in Georgia stemmed in part from a
security dilemma that had been developing, according
to which both the United States and Russia had been
pursuing their security interests in a unilateral fashion,
with little regard for the potential impact of their
actions on the other state. To emerge from this situation
and prevent miscommunication and miscalculation in
future crises, greater consultation is needed on key
security issues.
The Georgian crisis also has had a major impact on
Sino-Russian relations. The Sino-Russian partnership
reached a limit when Russia decided to recognize
the two break-away regions. Because of China’s own
concerns with separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet, the
Russian action evoked considerable concern in Beijing,
and China reportedly stymied Russia’s effort to gain
the support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) on this issue. For their part, Central Asian states
suddenly found themselves in an even more vulnerable
position as Russian pressure for economic and political
cooperation increased. The potential costs of what might
be perceived in Moscow as unduly close relations to
Washington became amply apparent in Russia’s effort
to destabilize the pro-Western government of Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili. Nonetheless, to maintain
their own independence of action, Central Asian states
have continued to seek cooperative relationships with
a range of partners, including the United States.
Since 2005, the prospects for democratic change
have been dimming, and Central Asian leaders have
become increasingly suspicious of what they view as
U.S. interference in their domestic affairs. Against a
background of renewed concerns about regime security
since the “color” revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine,
and Kyrgyzstan, and in light of the 2005 protests in
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Andijan, the Uzbek regime requested that the United
States close its base at Karshi Khanabad (known as K2).
With the rise in the price of oil, Russian influence in the
region and on energy flows has increased. Moreover,
Russia has become more determined to restore its
influence on its southern flank, partly to guarantee
access to needed gas supplies for reexport to Europe
and for its own domestic needs, but also to keep the
United States at bay. As China’s energy needs have
grown and its policymakers have sought to develop its
western provinces, China, too, has sought to expand
its influence in Central Asia. All of this is occurring
at a time when Al-Qaeda has become reinvigorated
in Afghanistan, instability is deepening in Pakistan,
a poor U.S. image pervades the Muslim world, and
the United States faces challenges in its relations with
Russia and China.
This monograph explores the appearance and reality of a consolidation of anti-U.S. interests in Central
Asia via the SCO and the Sino-Russian partnership. It
argues that while there is considerable suspicion of U.S.
designs on Central Asia, divergent interests within the
SCO, among Central Asian states, and especially between Russia and China serve to limit any coordinated
anti-U.S. activity. While a confluence of factors has
come together in recent years to limit the U.S. role in
Central Asia, this is not the same as the development
of a unified countercoalition. The monograph takes a
critical look at the Sino-Russian partnership and points
to differences on energy and economic integration in
Central Asia, despite common interests in maintaining
regime security and limiting U.S. influence in the
region. A section on the implications of the Georgian
crisis shows how this war highlighted the divergence
in Russian and Chinese interests, while accentuating
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the vulnerability of the Central Asian states to Russian
influence, and underlining the risks involved in U.S.
energy projects in the region.
Despite the fissures within the SCO and the
competitive tendencies within the Sino-Russian
partnership, the United States will not have an easy
time achieving its aims in Central Asia. American policy goals—energy cooperation, regional security, and
support for democracy and the rule of law—often run at
cross-purposes with one another and with U.S. policies
towards Pakistan and India. Declining assistance also
leaves the United States with fewer effective policy
instruments to recoup its declining influence among
Central Asian publics, address underlying conditions
which lead to regional instability, and press for
accountable governments that have the capacity to
address the growing range of transnational threats to
the region.
Despite the tendency to depict great power relations
in Central Asia as essentially conflictual, the United
States also faces many opportunities for multilateral
cooperation due to the increasing primacy of such
transnational threats. Given U.S. funding limitations,
the Obama administration should attempt to coordinate
with key allies, such as the EU and Japan, which also
have significant policy initiatives in Central Asia and
share many of the U.S. concerns. Moreover, the United
States also should seek opportunities to engage both
China and Russia on areas of common interest, such as
achieving stability in Afghanistan, reducing narcotics
and human trafficking, preventing proliferation,
and encouraging energy conservation and efficiency
in Central Asia. Finally, the United States should
explore mechanisms to engage the SCO, either within
the context of existing Organization for Security and
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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) initiatives, or through
new efforts, such as an SCO plus three format, which
could include the United States, Japan, and the EU
on issues of common concern like Afghanistan or
narcotics trafficking. The monograph develops these
recommendations in a final section.
U.S. Policy towards Central Asia.
After developing a patchwork of security, economic,
and political relationships with Central Asian states in
the 1990s, U.S. military cooperation expanded rapidly
with them in 2001-02, and anti-terrorism became the
central focus of American policy.1 As Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became frontline states
in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the United
States obtained temporary basing rights at Manas
(Kyrgyzstan) and K2 (Uzbekistan). By 2003, with
the U.S. military focused increasingly on Iraq, State
Department officials identified a more diverse array
of interests in Central Asia: (1) security (especially
anti-terrorism, but also nonproliferation, and stemming narcotics trafficking); (2) energy (ensuring reliable access of regional supplies to global markets
and encouraging associated revenue to be used for
sustainable development); and (3) domestic reform
(particularly the development of democratic political
systems and market-oriented mechanisms).2
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified Central Asia as a “geostrategic crossroads.” As the
QDR explained: “The U.S. will seek to shape not only
the choices of countries in those regions, but choices of
countries outside them that have interests or ambitions
within them.”3 In particular, Russia’s more assertive
energy diplomacy, at a time of peak oil prices, has
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caused concern. The QDR goes on to note that energy
represents an opportunity for economic development
in Central Asian states, but also could present a danger
that outside powers will seek to gain influence over
them. In an interview with Ekho Moskvy, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice noted that U.S. policy in Central
Asia proceeded from the belief that “Energy should not
be used in any way as a political tool.” To the contrary,
Rice emphasized the importance of diversity of supply
and diversity of routes, as well as the development of
alternative energy sources.4
Despite the particular concern over energy, State
Department officials continue to aim for “multidimensional relationships” with the Central Asian
states. As Deputy Secretary of State for South and
Central Asian Affairs Evan Feigenbaum explained,
. . . some people say we have a defense policy, we have a
democracy policy, we have a trade policy. No. We have
a foreign policy, and we want to do all of these things
simultaneously. . . . Now I personally don’t expect that the
speed of progress will necessarily be the same in terms of
our cooperation in every basket. It wouldn’t be realistic.
But we do think it’s important to be moving forward in
every basket. So I think with each government and with
each country the pace has varied a little bit from country
to countries.5

In Feigenbaum’s view, Central Asia is a particularly
important region because it represents a microcosm of
U.S. foreign interests, including Russia’s resurgence,
China’s regional and global footprint, the role of Iran,
the future of Afghanistan, terrorism, challenges posed
by Islam, and the goal of democracy promotion.6
On the surface, U.S. Central Asia policy appears to
have been highly consistent over the past 5 years. Thus,
the March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy explains
6

American interests in the region as encouraging energy
diversification, promoting democracy and free-market
economies, and enhancing security and anti-terrorism.7
Nevertheless, there has been a shift in emphasis since
2003, and Washington’s relations with individual
Central Asian states have changed markedly since
2005.
The American intervention in Iraq contributed to
an erosion of support for the United States across the
Muslim world, including Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan,
for example, a May 2007 poll by the International
Republican Institute and Gallup found that just 4
percent of respondents identified the United States as
the country that should receive priority in Bishkek’s
foreign policy.8 According to Orozbek Moldaliyev,
the director of Bishkek’s Research Center on Politics,
Religion, and Security, no anti-American sentiment
existed in Kyrgyzstan prior to the Iraq War.9 Now
opposition to the U.S. occupation of a Muslim state has
reinforced views critical of the United States, thanks in
part to the increasingly dominant Russian media, but
also to a series of irritants in bilateral relations as well
as domestic political changes (both discussed below).
The strategic significance of Central Asia for
Washington also appeared to decline after 2003, as Iraq
became the focal point in Washington and budgets
were tightened to finance the war. Thus, neither
American plans for Central Asia nor expectations in
the region have been fulfilled. The U.S. budget for
FY2009 shows a continual decline in overall aid to
the former Soviet states since 2007. Funding to these
states under the Freedom Support Act has decreased
in recent years. With the exception of Turkmenistan,
which saw a modest increase in Freedom Support
aid, overall Central Asian states saw their funding
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decline in FY2009.10 Over the next 2 years, Kyrgyzstan
will also receive an additional $16 million through
the Millennium Challenge account, a program that
links U.S. development aid to progress on democratic
reform.11
Nonetheless, military aid for Central Asian states
increased in FY2009,12 particularly for Kazakhstan,
through the Foreign Military Financing program,
and for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and, to a lesser extent,
Turkmenistan, through the International Military
Education and Financing program. (See Tables 1 and
2.) In the case of Kazakhstan, the United States aims to
develop a professional military that is capable of rapid
deployment in cooperation with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. forces.13 Generally speaking, most U.S. security aid to Central Asia
focuses on threats to border security posed by terrorism, proliferation, and narcotics trafficking. Although
much of the security assistance to Uzbekistan has been
cut due to its lack of progress on congressionally required human rights benchmarks, in 2009 the country
will continue to receive some limited counterterrorism
aid through Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. (See Table 3.)
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Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

FY 2007
Actual

3,205

1,425

250

250

0

FY 2008
Estimate

1,339

843

372

0

0

FY 2009
Request

2,000

900

724

150

0

Data comes from “US AID FY 2009 International Budget
Justification,” www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/.

Table 1. Foreign Military Financing
(Figures in Thousands of U.S.$).

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

FY 2007
Actual

1,217

1,161

359

424

0

FY 2008
Estimate

952

1,142

538

286

0

FY 2009
Request

750

1,590

1,450

300

0

Data comes from “US AID FY 2009 International Budget
Justification” www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009.

Table 2. International Military Education and
Financing (Figures in Thousands of U.S.$).
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Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

FY 2007
Actual

2,106

1,333

3,004

600

488

FY 2008
Estimate

4,188

2,984

3,976

1,050

893

FY 2009
Request

1,900

1,590

1,450

750

150

Data comes from “US AID FY 2009 International Budget
Justification” www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/.

Table 3. Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs
(Figures in Thousands of U.S.$).
Martha Olcott has noted that “The biggest
complication . . . has been U.S. advocacy of a ‘freedom
agenda’,” which was designed in large part to justify
the ongoing human and financial costs of the war in
Iraq, since it turned out there were no weapons of mass
destruction [WMD] there.”14 Authoritarian leaders
in Central Asia watched warily as the United States
supported democratic change in Georgia’s November
2003 Rose Revolution and then in Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution a year later. Suspicion regarding U.S.
intentions mounted once its former ally, President Askar
Akayev, was ousted in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan’s
Tulip Revolution.
In Central Asia and the Caucasus, as in the rest of
the Middle East, little progress has been made towards
democratization and, to the contrary, backtracking has
occurred. Freedom House included Kyrgyzstan in its
2007 list of “partly free” countries, though religious
freedom declined in the past year. The other four
Central Asian states were all ranked as “not free,” with
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Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan receiving particularly
low marks.15
Indeed, many experts observe that the double
standard in the priority of a commitment to
democratization in U.S. foreign relations with
countries in the Middle East and Central Asia,
essentially exempting key (authoritarian) allies, is
counterproductive. For example, a 2007 study by the
RAND Corporation concluded that engagement with
Uzbekistan on security issues had little impact on
promoting democratic change, transparency, or respect
for human rights.16 To the contrary, Alex Cooley argued
that the K2 basing agreement facilitated Uzbekistan’s
backsliding on human rights. Uzbek officials could
crack down on domestic opponents under the pretext
of cooperating in the war on terrorism while counting
on American reluctance to hold them accountable due
to the U.S. need for the K2 base. At a time when the
United Nations (UN) and human rights organizations
were sharply criticizing Uzbekistan’s human rights
record, the United States reportedly used extraordinary renditions to hand over suspects to Uzbek authorities, some of whom allegedly were interrogated in
K2.17
Congress held hearings on the double standard in the
Bush administration’s promotion of democracy in the
Muslim world. In his testimony, Thomas Malinowski,
advocacy director for Human Rights Watch, criticized
the U.S. Government for failing to impose sanctions
on Uzbekistan after the Andijan massacre, like the
EU did. Martha Olcott, on the other hand, argued that
the aid provided to Uzbekistan after its agreement to
lease a base to the United States in 2001 fell short of
expectations and never proved enough of a carrot to
prod resistant officials into making domestic policy
changes.18 Others see the vacillation in U.S. policy as a
11

struggle between competing priorities in the Pentagon
where security interests take precedence, and in the
State Department where democratic transformation is
the main priority.19
Relations with Kyrgyzstan, which once presented
the greatest hope for democratic change in the region,
have become more complicated after recent political
developments. Following President Akayev’s ouster,
Uzbekistan’s decision to terminate the U.S. lease at K2
and pressure by the SCO for the United States to leave
all of its bases in Central Asia, the Bakiyev government
demanded $200 million—instead of the $2 million
Washington had paid previously—to renew the lease
for the Manas airbase. In part this reflected Bakiyev’s
effort to distinguish himself from the corruption of the
previous government, since Akayev’s family benefited
from lucrative contracts associated with the U.S. base,
and corruption in the country limited any benefits to
the population as a whole.20 In the end, Washington and
Bishkek agreed to up the base leasing fee to $20 million
with an additional pledge of $150 million in aid, thus
ending up with a total figure close to the $200 million
requested and enabling Bakiyev to claim that he had
held firm in his demands with the Americans.21
Nonetheless, other irritants have emerged over the
Manas base, similar to the frictions experienced by the
United States at its bases in South Korea and Japan.
A near collision between a U.S. military aircraft and a
Kyrgyz civilian airliner and the shooting of a Kyrgyz
citizen at the airbase prompted calls in Bishkek for the
renegotiation of the terms of the lease, particularly
regarding immunity from prosecution for U.S. troops.22
If U.S. relations have become rockier with Kyrgyzstan,
the most important change has been in the relative
priority of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to U.S. policy.
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In FY2003 Uzbekistan received nearly three times as
much funding ($8.6 million) under the Foreign Military
Financing program than Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan,
which only received $2.9 million.23 Now that funding
levels overall are much reduced, Kazakhstan receives
more than its neighbors—$1.3 million in 2008, with $2
million requested for 2009 (see Table 1). After the United
States and other Western countries condemned the
crackdown by Uzbek security forces against peaceful
protestors in Andijan in May 2005, killing hundreds
and leading to a wave of repression, President Karymov
asked the United States to close its base by the end of
2005. Karymov, with the support of the SCO, justified
the repressive measures as a response to an antigovernment uprising supported by foreign groups.
As Uzbekistan’s star has waned, Kazakhstan has
become more central to U.S. Central Asia policy. Ever
since the 1990s, Kazakhstan has been important for U.S.
energy and nonproliferation policies, but since 2005
“Kazakhstan has become, by process of elimination,
the partner of choice for the United States in Central
Asia.”24 Because of its geostrategic position, sandwiched between Russia and China, and Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s long-standing interest
in carving out a uniquely Eurasian foreign policy, the
country has succeeded in developing good relations
with all of the great powers, its neighbors, plus the EU,
Japan, and South Korea.
While Kazakhstan supported U.S. operations in
Iraq25 and the war on terrorism, experts warn that there
are limits to American security cooperation with the
country. Kazakhstan is unlikely to agree to any basing
arrangement for fear that Russia would make a similar
demand, as occurred in Kyrgyzstan.26 Moreover,
with the sharp rise in the price of oil, Kazakhstan has
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taken a leaf out of the Russian playbook and started
renegotiating its long-standing oil agreements with
Western major buyers.27 Although Kazakhstan remains
an authoritarian regime, U.S. officials have been
inconsistent in their attention to its poor human rights
record. Thus, despite State Department criticism of the
Nazarbayev government for suppressing dissent, VicePresident Dick Cheney expressed his “admiration” for
Kazakhstan’s achievements in political development.
“The record speaks for itself,” said Cheney.28
In November 2007, the United States supported
Kazakhstan’s bid to become the first non-European
chair of the OSCE in 2010, conditional on its implementation of political reform.29 Since then U.S. officials have
performed verbal gymnastics to explain how such a
state was supposed to uphold European democratic
norms. Thus, in an interview with Voice of America,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Feigenbaum stated
that “. . . this is a historic opportunity for Kazakhstan.
There’s never been a Chairman of the OSCE quite
like Kazakhstan.”30 Further, Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Affairs Richard Boucher
optimistically told the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs that the prospect of the OSCE chairmanship
“may become a useful catalyst for Kazakhstan to
intensify political reform.”31
Deputy Chief of the U.S. OSCE mission Kyle Scott
noted that Kazakhstan had not improved its human
rights record to the extent Washington had hoped,
“but the year is not over, and I am optimistic that in
the second half of the year we will see further progress
by the government of Kazakhstan.”32 Scott spoke to
reporters at Radio Free Europe, which had seen its
website in Kazakhstan blocked for nearly 2 months in
the spring of 2008. Service was restored in early June
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only after pressure by the U.S. Government, the OSCE,
and human rights organizations.33
Turkmenistan has been of increasing interest,
especially since the death of Saparmurat Niyazov,
its President, in December 2006, but prospects for
cooperation remain uncertain. Considering Russia’s
efforts to monopolize Turkmenistan’s gas exports,
the United States has been pressing it to diversify
to earn a better return. This led on the one hand to
Turkmenistan’s demand for a higher price for the gas it
ships to Russia, but could also lead to higher prices for
any gas shipped directly to Europe. A TurkmenistanAfghanistan-Pakistan pipeline (TAP), which would
also involve Indian participation (sometimes called
TAPI), has been discussed for some time, but regional
security challenges pose considerable blockage to its
implementation.34
Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov attended the NATO summit in Bucharest
in April 2008 to discuss TAP and other energy
projects in private meetings with President George
Bush and Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai,
among others. Berdymukhammedov’s attendance at
the meeting, which he called a “good opportunity
for an exchange of opinions about the problems
of international security,” was particularly notable
given Turkmenistan’s long-standing position of neutrality.35 Although Turkmenistan has been a member
of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program since 1994,
former President Niyazov confined his country’s
participation in international organizations to
economics and trade.36
The other surprise guest at the April 2008 NATO
summit was Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov. The
deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan
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in recent years has reduced enthusiasm in Washington
and European capitals for his continued international
ostracism on human rights grounds. Claiming progress
in human rights dialogue, the EU twice suspended
sanctions it had imposed on travel by Uzbek officials
responsible for the Andijan massacre.37 In October
2008, the EU lifted the visa bans while continuing its
arms embargo against Uzbekistan.38
A series of high profile U.S. visitors, including
former Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander
Admiral William Fallon in January 2008, and Pamela
Spratlen, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Central Asian Affairs, in March, helped pave
the way for Karimov’s agreement to cooperate with
NATO in a rail corridor through Uzbekistan to support
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Karimov also
proposed restarting a lapsed multilateral initiative
on Afghanistan and including NATO as one of the
parties.39 Although the United States no longer has
basing rights at K2, German forces under NATO
command continue to use an air base at Termez in
Uzbekistan. One month prior to the NATO summit, on
March 5, 2008, U.S. Special Envoy to Central Asia and
the Caucasus Richard Simmons announced that the
Uzbek government would once again allow the United
States access to the base.40
With respect to Tajikistan, a poor country that
depends heavily on foreign donors, particularly Russia,
the United States has also been seeking to provide
additional strategic and economic options, particularly
in border control and energy. For example, the United
States has provided $40 million in aid to rebuild border
posts along the Afghan frontier, now that Tajikistan
resumed control over its border security from Russia
in 2005. The United States also financed a $36 million
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bridge connecting Afghanistan with Tajikistan,
replacing intermittent ferry service.41 Washington is
encouraging a regional electricity-sharing agreement
among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, India, and Pakistan, and
hopes to assist Tajikistan to become a major regional
hydropower exporter.42
Since 2005, the United States has sought to
encourage integration in Central Asia with South
Asia, partly to reduce Central Asian dependence on
Russia and China, but also to assist Afghanistan to
become more economically stable. Unlike former
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who
once termed Central Asia “an arc of crisis,” Secretary
Rice viewed it as an “arc of opportunity.”43 A number
of initiatives have been promoted to foster regional
cooperation. The State Department reorganized and
now situates Central Asian states with South Asia
in a new bureau for Central Asian and South Asian
Affairs.44 For U.S. policymakers, this reorganization
was designed to anchor Afghanistan economically,
as well as to eliminate what Secretary Rice called the
Cold War era “artifact” of Central Asia’s inclusion in
the Soviet Bureau.45
According to Assistant Secretary of State Boucher,
One of our goals in trying to work in Afghanistan is to
stabilize Afghanistan, so it can become a conduit and a
hub between South and Central Asia so that energy can
flow to the south. Ideas and goods can flow to the north.
People can move back and forth. Intellectual influences
can move back and forth. And so that the countries
of Central Asia are no longer bottled up between two
enormous powers of China and Russia, but rather they
have outlets to the south as well as to the north and the
east and the west.46

To promote regional integration in Central
and South Asia, the United States has supported a
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number of initiatives. The U.S. Trade Representative
has a trade and investment framework with the five
Central Asian states to foster cooperation in electricity,
telecommunications, water planning, and border
controls.47 The United States also works with the World
Bank to develop transportation infrastructure in the
region through the Asia Development Bank’s project
for Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
(CAREC), involving Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, plus Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and China.48
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Flux:
Implications for the United States.
Originating in an April 1996 meeting in Shanghai
on confidence-building for China, Russia, and the
Central Asian states bordering on China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the Shanghai Five gradually
adopted a broader economic, political, and security
agenda. Just 3 months before September 11, 2001
(9/11), the group became a formal regional security
organization known as the SCO, and expanded to
include Uzbekistan. The U.S. military intervention in
Afghanistan and agreements to use bases in Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan, as well as corresponding Russian
efforts to revive military cooperation within the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), eclipsed
the SCO’s security role at first. Consequently, American
officials initially downplayed the importance of the
organization, but after Uzbekistan decided at the 2005
annual meeting to request American forces to leave
its base at K2, the United States began paying closer
attention to the impact of the SCO for U.S. interests in
Central Asia. The possibility of Iran becoming a full
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member of the SCO has raised concern. Currently, Iran,
Pakistan, India, and Mongolia are SCO observers.
Although former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Edmund Giambastiani noted that the United
States was monitoring SCO military exercises closely,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld downplayed
the impact of the first Sino-Russian drill in 2005
(discussed below), claiming that “he didn’t see anything
threatening to Taiwan or anyone else.”49 Rumsfeld was
less sanguine about Iranian participation in the SCO,
however. He noted that it was “passing strange” for
a group, supposedly committed to anti-terrorism,
to consider membership for a state supporter of
terrorism.50 As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Feigenbaum noted, “There’s a debate in the United
States about what the SCO is, whether its members can
cooperate, and what their cooperation might mean for
us.”51
Scholars in the West also are divided about the
impact of the SCO on regional security and U.S.
interests in Central Asia.52 While recognizing that its
members have different agendas on certain issues, some
observers are concerned that China and Russia intend
to use the SCO as a vehicle for coordinated opposition
to the United States in Central Asia.53 Another
perspective goes even further, holding that the SCO is
notable for “evolving into one of the most powerful
regional organizations in post-Cold War Asia,” which
promotes strategic cooperation among Central Asian
states and seeks to protect regime security.54 Other
analysts downplay the potential threat the SCO could
pose to the United States and highlight the conflicts of
interests among the participants.55
Despite some concern in the West about the SCO’s
emergence as an anti-American alliance, officials reject
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this interpretation. Feigenbaum asserted that the
SCO is not a “‘new Warsaw Pact’. . . . Neither is the
SCO a ‘counterweight to NATO,’ not least because its
Central Asian members’ participation in the SCO has
by no means precluded their cooperation in NATO.”56
Similarly, on May 15, 2008, the defense ministers
from SCO member countries signed a communiqué
which stated unequivocally that “The SCO member
countries’ activities in the military field are not aimed
at establishing a military or political alliance and are
not targeted at a third party.”57
China and Russia held their first joint military
exercises (Peace Mission) from August 18-25, 2005,
on the Jiaodong peninsula in the People’s Republic
of China’s (PRC) Shandong province and the Yellow
Sea, involving 10,000 troops and an array of modern
military technology.58 Peace Mission 2005 followed on
previous SCO counterterrorism exercises in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and in Kazakhstan and China in 2003, but
was distinctive in its composition and unexpected location. The 2005 Sino-Russian exercise posited a hypothetical ethnic conflict breaking out in a third country,
which then appealed to its neighbors and the UN for
help.
While there was some speculation that China and
Russia had a Korean peninsula crisis in mind, actually
the location was a compromise. Originally Russia
proposed holding the exercise in Xinjiang, due to
its proximity to the Russian air base in Kyrgyzstan.
Instead, the PRC suggested Zhejiang province across
from Taiwan. When the Russian side rejected that
location as too provocative, the two countries agreed
to hold the exercise in Shandong province.59
Russia contributed a small number of forces, just
1,800 of the 10,000 total, but involved a substantial
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naval contingent from the Russian Pacific Fleet, including a large BDK-11 assault ship, an anti-submarine
warfare vessel, the Marshal Shaposhnikov; the destroyer,
Burny; and diesel submarines. The naval squadron
joined with Chinese forces to simulate a major amphibious landing on a beachhead in the Jiaodong peninsula. Russian bombers (Tu-95S Bear strategic bombers
and Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers) would
stage an air landing near Qingdao, including air cover
by SU-27SM fighters armed with AS-15 3,000 kilometer (km) cruise missiles against naval targets.
While Peace Mission 2005 may have been a joint
exercise, China and Russia were pursuing different
goals. For Russia this was an opportunity to train
its pilots, test its equipment, and, most importantly,
showcase its technology for China’s purchase. For
the PRC, the exercise provided an important training
function, but was also designed to demonstrate its
naval power to Taiwan and other neighbors.
In the aftermath of the Andijan events, cooperation
in law enforcement has become a new feature of SCO
exercises. Chinese officials attribute the shift to continued concern over terrorism and the need to take joint
action to address a wide range of transnational threats
such as trade in arms and drugs, human trafficking,
and money laundering.60 On August 24-26, 2006, law
enforcement agencies from China and Kazakhstan
cooperated in their first joint anti-terrorism exercise in
Almaty province in southeastern Kazakhstan and in
Yining in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous region.
From August 9-17, 2007, Chinese forces participated
in an SCO anti-terrorist exercise in Russia for the
first time. This was the first occasion since the 1969
Sino-Soviet border clashes that Chinese troops have
been on Russian soil and President Putin had to sign
a special law allowing for their presence.61 Peace
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Mission 2007 involved some 6,000 troops from all
six SCO members (including 1,600 from China, 4,700
from Russia, plus smaller numbers of paratroopers
from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and staff
representation from Uzbekistan), an additional 2,000
support personnel, Russian Mi-8, Mi-24, and Mi-28N
helicopters, Su-25 assault planes, armored personnel
carriers and tanks, as well as 46 Chinese aircraft (IL-76
transports and 8 Flying Leopard fighter-bombers) plus
China-made Type 96 armored vehicles and Type 99
tanks.62 It was the first overseas exercise for Chinese
airborne units and the largest SCO exercise to date.63
Peace Mission 2007 involved strategic consultation
and planning in Urumqi in Xinjiang and a drill in
Chelyabinsk, Russia.64 The scenario supposed that
terrorists seized a village near Chelyabinsk, took
hostages, and made political demands. The SCO
then ordered a counterterrorist operation. Defense
officials traveled to Urumqi to plan the operation,
which was carried out in the town of Chebarkul in the
Chelyabinsk region. Russian commentators questioned
the antiterrorism rationale for the exercise, which they
interpreted as a rehearsal for future operations to quell
political opposition, such as occurred in Andijan.65
The most important security development coincided
with the end of the exercise. On its last day, Russian
strategic bombers took to the skies again, an action that
had ceased after the end of the Cold War.
One odd feature of this exercise was that the
participating troops from the 4th and 6th Infantry
Divisions of China’s Xinjiang military district took an
unusually circuitous route to Chelyabinsk in western
Siberia.66 Instead of traveling 600 miles by the transAsian railway from Urumqi through Kazakhstan via
Astana to nearby Ekaterinburg, connected by road
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and rail to Chelyabinsk, the Xinjiang forces instead
traveled along a route 10 times as long, across China to
Manzhouli in Heilongjiang province, then headed west
across Eastern Siberia to the Urals, in effect circling
Mongolia’s entire border. According to some Russian
and Chinese media reports, Kazakhstan denied Chinese
troops transit permission.67 This lack of trust between
China and Kazakhstan was echoed in some less than
welcoming reactions within Russia to the presence
of Chinese troops. A spate of articles came out in the
Russian media suggesting that military cooperation
with China on Russian territory was foolhardy, given
China’s rising economic power and potential territorial
ambitions.68
Despite the undercurrent of unease, in June 27,
2007, the SCO states signed a treaty on holding
military exercises which member states are still in the
process of ratifying. On May 17, 2008, the SCO defense
ministers met to discuss further steps they could take
to strengthen cooperation in combating terrorism,
extremism, and separatism. They agreed to hold the
next set of exercises in Kazakhstan in 2010. Although
China’s Ambassador to Russia, Liu Guchang, praised
the 2005 and 2007 Peace Mission drills, he commented
that joint Sino-Russian exercises would not be held
frequently in the future. The Chinese Ambassador
added that “. . . if they must take place, they will
certainly be done quite successfully.”69 If regional
security cooperation within the SCO has its limits due
to a lack of trust among its members, its prospects for
regional economic integration are sometimes overstated
and confused with the (competing) efforts by Russia
and China to reorient Central Asian economies in their
direction, which will be discussed in greater detail in
the next section.
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Russia, for its part, has been seeking to maintain
its access to Central Asian gas and contain Chinese
economic ambitions in the region by involving regional
producers in a gas cartel dependent on Gazprom’s
pipeline network. The rise in oil prices has, on the one
hand, given Russia more global clout, but also has
empowered Central Asian producers to look beyond
Russia for better deals, especially on pricing. A variety
of other countries, including Japan, the EU, and India,
have indicated an interest. Thus, although Central
Asian states have achieved a higher profile as economic
players, through their individual connections to various
states inside and outside the region, such efforts have
not produced true regional integration.
This has not been for a lack of trying. Central Asian
states first raised the prospect of a Common Market in
1993 and subsequent years saw a succession of efforts to
create an economic community. Its ultimate expression,
the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO),
effectively merged with the Russian-organized Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) in 2005, diluting
the prospects for a truly Central Asian union.70
Although President Nazarabayev continues to advocate
such a union, scholars note that none of the previous
efforts to create a multilateral trade network has been
effective.71
Inadequate infrastructure has been a major
impediment. At a meeting on regional integration,
then Director of the State Department’s Office of
Central Asian Affairs Pamela Spratlen recounted her
experience traveling in the region in 2006:
. . . when I first came on board, I had the very ambitious
idea that I would go visit all five Central Asian capitals in
two weeks. And I thought I would be able to get around
and come back, and have a more fulsome understanding
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not only of the capitals, but I was even ambitious enough
to think that I could get out into the regions in this twoweek period. Well, we started planning my travel,
and I hear the chuckling. It turned out that the flight
connections, not just within Central Asia but just getting
to Central Asia; I mean, I had to sort of remind myself
of the amount of time that takes. And then, the idea of
actually traveling within turned out to be a great deal
more challenging than I ever imagined; all the connections
either went through Moscow or Istanbul or Frankfurt,
and it just wasn’t possible to fly between some of the
capitals. And so I thought, well perhaps what I could do
is fly between some, and then I would drive to get to other
places; how about driving from Dushanbe to Ashgabat,
for example. Well, we looked at that—(laughter)—and
it turned out that wasn’t going to be possible either. So
I have a very personal understanding of the importance
of integrating Central Asia, and the difficulties of trying
to make that happen. And if I, as a U.S. government official going on a one-time basis or irregular basis to the
region, have this understanding based on my attempt to
try to do this travel, I can only imagine what it’s like for
a businessperson who’s thinking about trying to build a
business from the ground up in Central Asia or develop
a partnership and really address the challenges of trying
to do business there in one country, but certainly in
trying to do it in many . . .72

While the more grandiose plans for an EU-type
economic community have not borne fruit, progress
has been made recently in improving regional transportation and energy infrastructure. The Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, involving Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, plus Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, China,
Mongolia, and six multilateral organizations (Asian
Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development [EBRD], International Monetary
Fund [IMF], Islamic Development Bank, World

25

Bank, and the United Nations Development Program
[UNDP]), is moving forward with a strategy to develop
six transportation corridors to connect countries within
the region and to the rest of Eurasia, to harmonize
transport and customs regulations, and to develop a
regional electricity market.73
Since 2004, the SCO has sought to develop cooperation in the energy sphere. In November 2006, Russian
officials raised the idea of a region-wide energy club, an
idea also supported by Kazakhstan. The declaration at
the August 2007 summit called for continued “dialogue
on energy to promote the pragmatic cooperation
between energy producing countries, transit countries,
and consuming countries.”74 President Nazarbayev
spoke of the region’s pipeline network forming a basis
for “an Asian energy market.”75 Former President Putin,
a major advocate of an SCO energy club, asserted such
an organization would provide “a powerful impetus
to regional projects in the interests of all SCO member
states . . .”76 Nonetheless, energy cooperation to date
has tended to focus on bilateral projects, driven by
competing development agendas. The creation of a
true Central Asian energy market could speed up the
diversification of pipeline routes, thereby anchoring
producing states to consuming states and potentially
undermining the cohesiveness of the SCO itself.77 With
Russia, China, and Western companies advocating for
pipelines flowing in different directions, and Central
Asian energy producing countries competing with one
another for contracts, region-wide energy cooperation
faces many challenges indeed.
According to Timur Dadabaev, an expert on Central
Asian regional integration, multilateral development
projects face three types of impediments. First, Central
Asian states view each other as competitors, particularly
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in the energy sector. This results in barriers to trade
within the region, while individual states seek partners
outside. Second, many of the more promising areas for
cooperation, for example, regulating access to water
supplies, would require states to address collective
goods problems and involve some loss of sovereignty
for the mutual benefit of the region. Finally, Dadabaev
notes that the five Central Asian states are pursuing
different economic models, with Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan opting for liberal reform, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan continuing state-led development, and
war-torn Tajikistan relying on foreign aid.78
While this monograph focuses on U.S.-RussiaChina competition in Central Asia, other rivalries in
the region pose challenges for economic integration.
Nicklas Norling and Niklas Swanström note that the
conflict between Pakistan and India brought the South
East Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) to a standstill and has the potential to stymie
the work of the SCO, should the two countries accede
to full membership.79 Moreover, even as Sino-Indian
relations improve, they are emerging as competitors
for trade and energy markets in Central Asia.
China, Russia, and Central Asia.
Central Asia has turned out to be both an important
arena for Sino-Russian cooperation and an equally
significant test of its limits. The following section first
explores the areas of agreement in Chinese and Russian
policies towards Central Asia.
China and Russia have three areas of overlapping
concern in Central Asia. First, they both view the region
as a test case for their aim to create a multipolar world
order, based on a “democratic” vision of international
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affairs in which a variety of states wield influence and
counterbalance U.S. power. In their May 23, 2008, joint
statement, Russia and China asserted that “International security is comprehensive and inalienable, and
some countries’ security cannot be guaranteed at the
cost of some others’, including expanding military
and political allies.”80 Russian and Chinese leaders
regularly call for greater cooperation and coordination
in the SCO between their two countries in the context
of their broader goal of promoting of multilateral
diplomacy.81
For Russia and China alike, events in Central Asia
have appeared to vindicate their broader foreign policy
goals. The loss of the K2 base at a time when the United
States was bogged down in two wars was interpreted
by some Russian analysts as the beginning of the
decline of American empire and a potential turning
point for Moscow’s resurgence in Central Asia.82
Others see Russia’s embrace of the SCO as a defensive
move, responding to a security vacuum in the region
and disappointment in U.S.-Russian relations.83
For China, involvement with SCO reflects the
Chinese leadership’s conception of a “harmonious
world” premised on multilateralism, common
security, common prosperity, and respect for each
country’s right to choose its own development path.84
Indeed, what Chinese officials term the “Shanghai
Spirit” incorporates many of the same concepts. As
the June 15, 2006, SCO declaration affirms: “The SCO
owes its smooth growth to its consistent adherence to
the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ of ‘mutual trust, mutual benefit,
equality, consultation, respect for multicivilizations
and pursuit of common development.’ This spirit is
the underlying philosophy and the most important
code of conduct of SCO.”85
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While agreeing that any U.S. basing should be
short-term and directly linked to the security situation
in Afghanistan, both Russia and China have been
reluctant to grant Iran full membership in the SCO
for fear that this would turn the organization in an
explicitly anti-American direction and encourage
Western states to increase their pressure on China and
Russia to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis.86 No new
members have been admitted since Uzbekistan joined
in 2001, but Iran has been seeking full membership
as its conflict with the United States and the EU has
intensified.
Second, Russia and China share concern over regime security and place a priority on stability over democratic change. Scholars note the similarity between the
Russian conception of “sovereign democracy,” which
purports to adapt democratic principles to Russian
values, and the “Beijing consensus,” based on gradual
socio-economic reforms with a priority on Chinese
values such as equity and social stability, unlike the
focus on democracy and privatization underlying the
Washington Consensus.87 Regime stability, for China
and Russia, is essential for regional stability in Central
Asia.88 Consequently, they both uphold the priority of
noninterference in domestic affairs of SCO states and
proclaim the right for sovereign states to choose their
own model of development free of external pressures.
Third, they are committed to combating what the
Chinese term the “three evils”: separatism, terrorism,
and extremism. For Russia and China, this has largely
referred to mutual support for individual steps to
address domestic threats. It is worth remembering
that the Shanghai 5 began meeting at a time when
Russia was focused on threats related to Chechnya,
while some separatists in Xinjiang used violence in
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the 1990s to pursue their goals.89 Since 9/11, concern
over transnational threats emerging from Afghanistan
has grown, and the SCO has opened a regional
counterterrorism center in Tashkent. Nevertheless,
anti-terrorist drills under the SCO’s auspices continue
to focus on domestic rather than regional threats,
and it is hard to imagine how the group could agree
to intervention in a scenario where a member faced
a separatist threat, given the SCO’s commitment
to noninterference, not to mention ongoing border
disputes and lingering tensions among members.
Despite the apparent identity of interests between
China and Russia in SCO, the reality is more complex.
Even on security matters, there are some differences.
Despite Russia’s preference for security cooperation
as the main purpose of the SCO, an even better
scenario (from Moscow’s perspective) would involve
its subordination to the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), a formal alliance under Russian
control, which does not include China (but does involve
Armenia and Belarus). Russia has been seeking to
increase coordination between the two organizations
in an effort to become the hub of all Eurasian security
networks, but has met with resistance within the SCO,
especially from China. For example, Russia sought
to make the Peace Mission 2007 a joint SCO-CSTO
exercise, but China rejected the idea and the CSTO was
limited to the role of observer.90
Russia and China are competitors for economic
influence in Central Asia and have different priorities
on many key issues. In particular, Russia remains
suspicious of China’s interest in developing multilateral
economic cooperation in Central Asia and, as a result,
prefers to focus on security cooperation within the SCO,
while pursuing economic cooperation either bilaterally
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or through other organizations, such as the EurAsEc, a
vehicle for restoring Russian economic influence in the
post-Soviet space. China is not a member of EurAsEc.
While generally supportive of the SCO, the Russian
Foreign Policy concept, published in July 2008, clearly
places a priority on developing CIS institutions
such as the CSTO, identified as “a key instrument to
maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS . . .,”
and EurAsEc, termed “a core element of economic
integration.”91 By contrast, the SCO’s main purpose
appears to be to coordinate multilateral initiatives with
CIS and Asian organizations.92
Meanwhile, China has been pushing for greater
economic cooperation within the SCO, while Russia
has been demurring. According to Alexander Lukin,
Director of East Asian and SCO Studies at the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO),
Russia has been unwilling to contribute to a planned
SCO Development Fund for fear that China would
dominate the institution, once it began to function.93
The Russian government also has been reluctant to
move forward with a plan to create a free trade zone
in Central Asia scheduled to go into force in 2023, due
to concerns over China’s aggressive exports policy in
the region. Lukin notes that the $920 million China
offered to the SCO is to be used to support purchases
of Chinese goods.94
Unlike Russia, China sees the goals of economic
and security cooperation in the SCO as interconnected
and places a priority on the economic dimension.
Some Chinese analysts perceive a Russian effort to
regain its influence in Central Asia,95 which they view
as an obstacle to deepening economic cooperation.
Chinese critics have likened Russian views to a “siege
mentality” and “old thinking,”96 though others note
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that Central Asian leaders are equally suspicious of
Chinese intentions.97
Zhao Huasheng, Director of Russian and Central
Asian Studies at Fudan University’s Shanghai
Cooperation Center, argues that economic cooperation
will ensure the long-term relevance of the SCO, as
current security threats recede.98 Pan Guang, Director of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies Center
at the Shanghai Center for International Studies, notes
that economic cooperation, particularly in the energy
sector, is accelerating and will continue to grow despite
the lack of enthusiasm in Russia. He acknowledges,
however, that Russian initiatives thus far have been
reactive. For example, President Vladimir Putin
proposed creating an energy club within the auspices
of the SCO just weeks after China began receiving its
first pipeline oil from Kazakhstan in May 2006.99
The intensifying Sino-Russian competition over
energy in Central Asia is likely to overshadow plans for
an SCO energy club. China and Russia are competitors
in determining supply routes, creating transnational
energy complexes, and investing in exploration and
pipeline projects. How these three issues are resolved
will not only have a significant impact on economic
integration within the SCO, but also will affect
economic development within Russia and China and
shape flows of energy outside the region, including to
the United States.
In Alexei Malashenko’s view, alternative energy
pipeline routes are “the Kremlin’s worst nightmare. . . .” because they will reduce Russian leverage over
Central Asia as well as making it less likely for Russia
to become an energy superpower.100 Indeed, Russia
is facing rebellion in two directions and is seeing its
monopoly over Central Asian gas exports increasingly
challenged. The most heated competition is centered on
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control over gas exports from Turkmenistan to Europe,
which now flows through Russian pipelines. The EU
and the United States have been trying to convince
Turkmenistan to participate in the trans-Caspian and
Nabucco gas pipeline projects which would connect
Europe to Caspian resources, bypassing Russia. In
response, Gazprom announced in September 2008
that it was prepared to offer Turkmenistan (as well as
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) “European” prices for
contracts beginning in 2009, possibly as much as $400/
thousand cubic meters (tcm), and more than double
the current rate of $150/tcm.101
Frustration with negotiations with Russia on an oil
pipeline spanning from Eastern Siberia to Northeastern
China, coupled with mounting concerns over the
stability of oil supplies and shipments from the Middle
East, and an interest in transforming Xinjiang into a
new major oil and gas production and refining center,
have led China to seek out a number of cooperative
projects with Central Asian states.102
For the past decade, for example, China has been
pursuing a “Go West” strategy to develop its western
provinces, including Xinjiang.103 In the past 5 years,
President Hu Jintao has raised the priority of boosting
the development of inland areas. Growing energy
and transportation ties with neighboring Kazakhstan
help support that aim as Xinjiang is becoming a new
center for China’s oil and gas industry. As in Tibet, in
Xinjiang the Chinese government has sought to create
disincentives for separatism by boosting the local
economy and harshly repressing activities seen as
promoting in any way Uighur self-determination. The
Uighurs, who are Sunni Muslims, constitute 46 percent
of Xinjiang’s population of 19 million. Another 350,000
Uighurs live in Kazakhstan, with 50,000 in Kyrgyzstan,
and 50,000 in Uzbekistan.104
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The Chinese government claims to have disrupted
plots by Islamic terrorists in Xinjiang in the months
leading up to the Olympics and reported that violent
attacks in August 2008 resulted in the deaths of 22 police
officers and one civilian.105 Beijing also has alleged
that Uighur terrorists were fighting in Afghanistan
and Chechnya. After the Chinese contended that the
leader of one Uighur group, the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM), had ties to Osama Bin Laden, both
the United States and the UN listed it as a terrorist
organization in 2002. According to a Canadian security
analyst, after ETIM’s leader, Hasan Mahsum, died in
2003, this group largely has been inactive. Moreover,
he notes that Uighurs follow Sufi practices which AlQaeda views as heretical, making any real alliance
between Uighur groups and Al-Qaeda unlikely.106
Many Western experts on Xinjiang dispute the
existence of a threat by Islamic radicalism in Xinjiang.
They note that while a religious renewal has been
occurring, the threat of radical Islam really originates
within Pakistan and Afghanistan, not in Xinjiang or its
Central Asian neighbors.107 By conflating separatism
and terrorism in Xinjiang, the Chinese government has
a pretext to pressure Central Asian governments to
limit activities by Uighur groups in their countries, as
well as to crack down on legitimate religious activity
within Xinjiang. For example, in September 2008,
Chinese authorities instituted new rules prohibiting
government officials, Communist party members,
students, and teachers in Xinjiang from observing
Ramadan, as well as limiting the size of prayer
groups, imposing new travel restrictions on religious
pilgrimages to other countries, and opposing Muslim
traditions such as women wearing veils and men
growing beards.108
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Beijing’s effort to develop Xinjiang’s energy industry, coming at a time of mounting concern about energy security, has led Chinese energy companies to seek
out new projects for exploration and pipeline delivery
in Central Asia. Major energy projects are already
underway with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In a first
for the Central Asian state, Turkmenistan agreed to a
production-sharing agreement with China. According
to their 2006 agreement, a 7,000km gas pipeline will
be built to ship 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually,
mostly from Turkmenistan, to Shanghai in China for 30
years beginning in 2009.109 China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) is the operator for the project,
while companies from Turkmenistan as well as transit
countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will hold 50
percent ownership of the pipelines passing through
their territory. Pipeline construction has already
begun in all three countries, with Kazakhstan building
a 1,300km pipeline, Uzbekistan a 530km pipeline, and
Turkmenistan a 188km pipeline.110
After 7 years of negotiations, in 2004 China and
Kazakhstan finally agreed on a multistage pipeline
project.111 The first stage, spanning from Atasu in
Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China was completed in
December 2005 and began shipping oil in July 2006.
The second stage, slated for completion in October
2009, will connect this pipeline to Kazakhstan’s western fields, providing China with access to Caspian
oil. China now receives 3.6 percent of its crude oil by
pipeline from Kazakhstan, just under 6 million tons.112
Once the final stage of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline
is completed, China could receive up to 20 million tons
of oil annually, making Kazakhstan one of China’s top
four crude suppliers.
Although China and its Central Asian partners
view their expanding cooperation as a means of
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diversifying their energy partnerships, Russia has thus
far been successful in participating in major projects. In
November 2007, two Russian companies (TNK-BP and
GazpromNeft) signed an agreement with KazTransOil
to ship up to 5 million tons oil annually to China via
the Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu-Alanshakou pipeline. In
the first quarter of 2008, 300,000 tons of Russian crude
were exported to China along this route.113 Moreover,
a Russian engineering company, Stroytransgaz, won
a tender to build Turkmenistan’s section of the gas
pipeline to China.114
As Russia struggles to maintain its preeminent
position in Central Asian energy networks and the EU
and the United States also compete for access, China
is likely to face new pressures from its partners in the
region to pay higher prices for its gas and oil. Some
Chinese energy experts already question the costeffectiveness of relying on lengthy pipelines to connect
China’s energy-hungry eastern cities to Central Asian
energy resources, when these cities could more easily
rely on imported liquid natural gas (LNG) from
Australia and Indonesia.115
Impact of the Georgian Crisis.
Russian-Georgian relations had been on a downward spiral since the election of President Saakashvili in 2004. As Georgia increased its cooperation with the
EU and the United States (which supported Georgia’s
bid to join NATO), Russian-Georgian tensions heightened over the status of two autonomous regions within
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Saakashvili
sought to reintegrate those regions into the Georgian
state, while Russia expanded cooperation with them
and supported their bid for autonomy.116
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After exchanges of fire broke out between Georgian
and South Ossetian forces on August 6 and 7, Georgian
forces attacked Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian
capital, providing a pretext for Russian intervention.
Russian forces then moved beyond South Ossetia,
occupied Georgian territory, destroying villages and
infrastructure, and also moved into Abkhazia, which
had not been involved in the fighting.117 Russia claimed
that it was acting in defense of Russian peacekeepers
and civilians,118 although most of the latter were South
Ossetians to whom the Russian government recently
had provided Russian passports.
Georgia has disputed Russia’s claim that war erupted after Georgian forces shelled the South Ossetian
capital, Tskhinvali, on August 7. On September 15,
the Georgian government released transcripts of
intercepted telephone calls among Georgian military
personnel that provide evidence of Russian troop
movements prior to August 7.119 A Russian journalist’s
eyewitness account from South Ossetia makes a similar
claim about Russian armored troop movements on the
night of August 6.120
In contrast to Georgia’s depiction of its actions as
defense, however, independent military observers
for the OSCE lent credence to the Russian position.
According to these observers, who were unable
to confirm Georgian accounts of Russian attacks
on Georgian villages, Georgia’s military fired
indiscriminately on civilians and Russian peacekeepers
in Tskhinvali.121 A report by Amnesty International
condemned both sides for failing to protect civilians
and engaging in serious human rights violations. As
a result of the conflict, as many as 200,000 civilians
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were displaced and civilian deaths surpassed military
casualties. 122
If Russia sought to use Gazprom to dominate
the Central Asian economies at the expense of other
investors prior to the Georgian crisis, since August
2008 the Medvedev government has defined more
explicitly a sphere of political interest in regions with
which Russia historically has had special relations. In
an August 31 television interview, President Medvedev
outlined five principles governing Russian foreign
policy, including (1) respect for international law; (2)
the unacceptability of a unipolar world dominated
by the United States; (3) interest in cooperation with
other countries and rejection of policies leading to
confrontation and isolation; (4) determination to protect
Russian citizens and interests overseas; and (5) placing
a priority on developing friendly ties “with regions in
which Russia has privileged interests.”123
Medvedev later tried to justify military action as a
defensive effort to protect Russian nationals and South
Ossetian civilians, comparable to U.S. actions after
9/11.124 As Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained,
Russia’s economic successes now enable it to play a
key role in the international community and to stand
up for its citizens, according to the UN Charter’s right
to self-defense.125 Lavrov also reminded his audience
that he had spoken the previous year of the prospect
of international recognition of Kosovo’s independence
as a red line “which inflict[s] unacceptable harm upon
our national interests and undermine[s] international
legality.” The Foreign Minister went on to describe
other areas where Russia felt its security interests were
disregarded, including the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) treaty, missile defense in Eastern
Europe, and NATO expansion.126
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In a November 5 speech to the Russian Federal
Assembly, President Medvedev put the blame for the
Georgian events squarely on “the arrogant course of
the U.S. administration, which hates criticism and
prefers unilateral decisions.” He greeted Barack
Obama’s election with tough talk on missile defense
in Eastern Europe, which he pledged to counter with
mobile missiles in Kaliningrad.127 After a meeting with
Sarkozy, Medvedev appeared to reconsider, arguing
instead that a conference on European security should
be held next summer and that all states should avoid
any unilateral moves in the interim. France, which
held the EU presidency in the second half of 2008, has
urged the Obama administration to reassess its missile
defense plans, while supporting a resumption of EU
talks with Russia in November. 128
Another goal of the Russian intervention in Georgia
was to destabilize its political leadership in hope of
unseating its president, whom Medvedev referred
to “a political corpse.” Prime Minister Putin further
speculated that the United States “gave Mr. Saakashvili
carte blanche for any actions, including military ones”
in hope of benefiting one of the presidential candidates,
a reference to John McCain.129 McCain, whose top
foreign policy adviser, Randy Scheunemann, worked
as a lobbyist for the Georgian government,130 strongly
supported that government and counts President
Saakashvili as a close friend. After the Russian invasion,
McCain stated that “We are all Georgians,” a reference
to the headline in Le Monde after the 9/11 attacks, which
proclaimed that “We Are All Americans.”
The Bush administration denied strongly any
complicity in Georgian military action, and State
department officials testified that, to the contrary, they
urged Georgian officials not to be provoked by Russian
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and South Ossetian actions.131 Nonetheless, some
observers in the United States and Europe argued that
Washington was sending mixed messages to Georgia
and saw Vice President Cheney’s September visit
as unnecessarily provocative.132 Indeed, Konstantin
Kosyachov, who heads the Foreign Affairs Committee
in the lower house of the Russian parliament, accused
Cheney of masterminding the Georgian crisis and
seeking to create an “anti-Russian axis.”133 During
his visit to Georgia, Cheney condemned the Russian
invasion in the sharpest terms, calling it “an illegitimate,
unlilateral attempt to change your country’s borders by
force that has been universally condemned by the free
world.” In Cheney’s view, Russian actions in Georgia
cast doubt on its reliability as a partner and its overall
intentions.134
Despite Russian efforts to portray their actions
in Georgia as defensive, the United States and
most European countries viewed their behavior as
aggressive. Secretary Rice warned that “the legitimate
goals of rebuilding Russia has taken a dark turn
with the rollback of personal freedoms, the arbitrary
enforcement of the law, the pervasive corruption at
various levels of Russian society, and the paranoid,
aggressive impulse which has manifested itself before
in Russian history.”135 Although no specific sanctions
were imposed, the United States and the EU committed
to a major economic and humanitarian assistance effort
for Georgia and many planned areas of cooperation with
Russia were put on hold indefinitely.136 Specifically,
the Bush administration suspended talks with Russian
counterparts on civil nuclear cooperation and sent Navy
ships to Georgian ports to assist with humanitarian aid,
while the EU shelved plans to negotiate a partnership
agreement with Russia, and the NATO-Russia council
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became inoperative. Russia now faces an uphill battle in
its efforts to join the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).
If Russia had hoped that it would find support for its
actions in Georgia within the SCO, this turned out not
to be the case, apparently largely due to China’s unease
over Russian recognition of the two breakaway regions.
Prior to the recognition, Chinese media coverage
largely echoed Russian positions, and, even afterwards,
Chinese experts sympathized with Russian opposition
to NATO’s expansion.137 After Russia recognized the
two regions on August 26, however, Chinese officials
began expressing their concern. On August 27, Hu Jintao
and Medvedev met in Dushanbe and discussed the
Georgian crisis, among other issues. After the Russian
President briefed his counterpart on South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, Hu confined his remarks to an extremely
bland statement, which was far from the expression
of support Medvedev may have been seeking. Hu
stated: “China has noticed the latest developments in
the region, expecting all sides concerned to properly
settle the issue through dialogue and cooperation.”138
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Qin Gang,
issued a statement that same day which further noted
that “China is concerned of the latest development in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia” and reiterated the hope
that “the relevant parties can resolve the issue through
dialogue and consultation.”139 Depicting the minimal
support Moscow received from friends and allies,
Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center noted
that the “Foreign Ministry of China took its time before
issuing an essentially pointless statement.” 140
Although the SCO held its eighth meeting in
Dushanbe on August 28, 2 days after the Russian
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recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the joint
declaration made no mention of it. Instead, SCO
members “expressed deep concern over the recent
tension triggered by the South Ossetia issue, and urge
the relevant parties to resolve the existing problems
peacefully through dialogue and to make efforts for
reconciliation and negotiations.”141 Although the SCO
went on to praise Russian efforts to promote a resolution
of the conflict, they also highlighted the importance of
“efforts aimed at preserving the unity of the state and
its territorial integrity . . .”142
The key role China played in narrowing the
scope of SCO support for Russia’s approach to the
Georgian crisis seems readily apparent when the
SCO statement is compared to the one issued by the
CSTO, which includes Armenia and Belarus as well as
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
(but not China).143 Although the CSTO’s September 5
declaration sides with the Russian view of the conflict,
only mentioning Georgia’s efforts to resolve the South
Ossetian situation by force and praising “Russia’s
active role in assisting peace and cooperation in the
region,” nonetheless even the CSTO member states
did not go so far as to recognize South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Instead, the declaration confined its support
for “the ensuring of lasting security for South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.”144
One of the immediate implications of the Georgian
crisis was to reinvigorate energy diplomacy in Central
Asia, while highlighting the risks involved in building
pipelines in the region.145 Failing to receive the desired
level of support on Georgia from the Central Asian
states, Russian leaders have sought to anchor the
region more firmly through a more extensive web
of energy agreements. During a visit by President
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Putin in early September, President Karymov, who is
cooperating with China on another pipeline project
while also seeking to improve his country’s relations
with the West, signed an agreement to build a gas
pipeline that would ship up to 30 billion cubic meters
of gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Russia.146
In October, Kyrgyzstan agreed to sell a 75 percent
stake in Kyrgyzgaz to Gazprom. Although there is
little gas in the country (6 billion cubic meters), Russia
is seeking to expand its influence in Kyrgyzstan, while
the latter hopes to reduce its energy dependence on
Uzbekistan.147
U.S. officials were equally active in the region.
Following a Russian visit to Turkmenistan to discuss
energy cooperation, Assistant Secretary of State for
Central Asia George Krol went to Dushanbe in early
September to discuss the trans-Caspian pipeline.
Despite new awareness of the project’s vulnerability
and sensitivity, since the pipeline would need to
transit through Georgia, both the United States and
Turkmenistan remain interested in the project.148 In
September Vice-President Cheney visited Georgia,
Armenia, and Ukraine, while Secretary of State
Rice visited Kazakhstan in October. She denied
that the Bush administration sought to encourage
Kazakhstan to improve its relations with Washington
at Moscow’s expense. Rice noted that “Kazakhstan is
an independent country. It can have friendships with
whomever it wishes,” a sentiment echoed by Kazakh
foreign minister Marat Tazhin.149
This fall Chinese leaders also visited Central Asia.
In late October Prime Minister Wen Jiabao traveled to
Kazakhstan to discuss keeping the second phase of the
construction of their joint oil pipeline project on schedule as well as other aspects of bilateral cooperation.150
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That same month, the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) agreed to develop an oilfield in
Uzbekistan, which has estimated reserves of 30 million
tons with expected annual capacity of 2 million tons.151
CNPC is already building a gas pipeline through
Uzbekistan. After signing a framework agreement
with Turkmenistan in late August, CNPC announced
in September that it would increase gas imports from
Turkmenistan to 40 billion cubic meters a year from
the current level of 30 billion cubic meters.152
Although the Georgian crisis reinvigorated the
competition for energy resources, it also revealed
Russia’s vulnerabilities by destabilizing Russia’s economy. In the weeks following the invasion, foreign
investors fled, taking $21 billion in capital with them.
Investors already were concerned about the Russian
government’s economic approach in light of pressure
placed by Russian shareholders on the British BP-TNK
joint venture and Putin’s threatening attitude towards
a coal and steel executive, whom he accused of price
gauging.153 With the American financial meltdown in
September and the resulting decline in the price of oil
in October, since May the Russian stock market has lost
two-thirds of its value. The Russian government had to
close down the stock exchange early on a number of
occasions in September and infused $190 billion into the
banking system.154 Despite the analogies between the
Russian intervention in Georgia and Soviet behavior
during the Cold War, one major difference, providing
the West with leverage, is the Russian economy’s level
of global integration. Medvedev has acknowledged
that the Georgian crisis has had a negative impact
and claimed that Russia does not want to be isolated
economically, though he added that his country would
not be pressured economically by the West.155
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Conclusions: Prospects for Great Power Competition
in Central Asia.
In assessing U.S.-Russia-China competition in
Central Asia, this monograph has outlined a complex
web of relationships in the region. An overview of
changing U.S. Central Asia policy over the past 5 years
reveals an effort to respond to changing developments
on the ground, most recently the Georgian crisis, but
also the “color” revolutions, the Andijan events in
Uzbekistan and its subsequent decision to end U.S.
basing rights at K2, Kazakhstan’s economic rise, and
leadership change in Turkmenistan. At the same
time, the worsening security situation in Afghanistan
and growing insecurity about energy supplies has
heightened U.S. interest in security and economic
cooperation in Central Asia. These concerns have
further undermined the already inconsistent and
marginally effective U.S. efforts to promote democratic
change in the region.
In fact, U.S. policy goals are turning out to be
mutually incompatible and counterproductive. The
initial phase of U.S. involvement in Central Asia
after 9/11 focused on anti-terrorism, highlighting a
symptom rather than underlying domestic causes of
regional insecurity, such as corrupt and unaccountable
governments, and pervasive poverty.156 In recent years,
the growing priority of energy in U.S. relations with
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states has created
disincentives for further political reforms in these
countries. According to a 2008 Freedom House report,
. . . energy needs are increasingly distorting relationships
between democracies that consume hydrocarbons and
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the authoritarian states that produce them. Euro-Atlantic
democracies have yet to agree on a common strategy
that advances both energy-security needs and basic
democratic values. Energy dependence is promoting
an uncoordinated and short-term approach to relations
with authoritarian governments, the hardening core of
which is located in the non-Baltic former Soviet Union.
These democratically unaccountable countries are
moving farther from the Euro-Atlantic neighborhood
and creating alliances and networks outside of the
Western community. As energy wealth has emboldened
authoritarian rulers, the Euro-Atlantic democracies
have seemingly lost their resolve and sense of common
purpose in advancing democratic practices.157

Freedom House points to a correlation between the
rising price of oil in the past decade and declining
indicators of democratic governance in major energy
producers, such as Kazakhstan. This is because energy
sector wealth strengthens the hand of authoritarian
rulers in countries where accountability was already
weak and exacerbates corruption and other rent-seeking
behaviors at the expense of democratic governance.158
Russia and China have been reacting to these
same pressures on the ground as the United States.
In response to the “color” revolutions, they achieved
broad agreement on the priority of regime security
and the need to limit the long-term military presence
of the United States in Central Asia. These are also two
key areas—defining the political path of Central Asian
states and securing a strategic foothold in the region—
where the United States finds itself in competition with
Russia and China.
Nonetheless, the Russia-China partnership should
not be seen as an anti-U.S. bloc, nor should the SCO
be viewed as entirely cohesive. Thus in assessing U.S.Russia-China competition, it is important to note that
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the United States is not necessarily squaring off against
Russia and China together. To the contrary, there are
areas where Russia and China are in competition with
one another, particularly in the economic realm, which
provide opportunities for U.S. policies. Moreover, the
lack of consensus between Beijing and Moscow over
economic integration within the SCO has weakened
the organization’s cohesiveness, while leaving room
for projects to integrate Central Asia economically with
South Asia, East Asia, and Europe, as well as for other
diplomatic initiatives to engage Central Asian states
on transnational issues of common concern.
The tendency to view U.S.-Russia-China competition in the region with 19th century lenses, as some sort
of “new great game” obscures the impact of globalization and the common interests the great powers
share in addressing transnational problems. The United
States, Russia, and China all have an interest in addressing narcotics trafficking, human trafficking,
and illegal arms trade in the region. They also have a
common stake in achieving stability in Afghanistan and
routing Al-Qaeda from the region. To the extent that
Russia, China, and the SCO as an organization share
these goals, the United States will face opportunities to
expand region-wide as well as for bilateral cooperation
with Russia and China on transnational problems.
In the short term, Russia’s intervention in Georgia
has created new obstacles to Russian-American
cooperation in Central Asia and elsewhere. The meeting
on October 22, 2008, between Admiral Mike Mullen,
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General
Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian General Staff,
was a hopeful sign that the two countries are trying to
work together to resolve pressing global problems. They
discussed exactly those issues that are most promising
for cooperation in Central Asia: NATO’s relations with
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Russia, improving cooperation on counterterrorism,
nonproliferation, and narcotics trafficking.159
Competition to secure basing arrangements and
energy contracts only benefits authoritarian regimes
at the expense of enduring regional security. U.S.
dialogue with Russia and China on security and
energy in Central Asia would contribute to regional
stability and help bring out areas of shared interest.
With China in particular, a fellow energy importer, the
United States shares many common interests in energy
in Central Asia, particularly the diversification of
supply routes away from frameworks monopolized by
the Russian energy sector. Although available reserves
in individual Central Asian states create competitive
pressures for access to energy supplies, expanding
Sino-American dialogue on energy security would
create better understanding of each country’s concerns
and generate ideas for moderating demand.
Policy Recommendations.
First, the United States needs to develop a set of
achievable and consistent policy goals for Central and
South Asia. The U.S. diplomatic approach to Central
Asia is premised on the elaboration of a broader
regional strategy that seeks to integrate Central and
South Asia. Despite the possible merit in seeking to
view Central Asia within a South Asian context, both
to support stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan
and to encourage regional economic integration more
broadly, the Bush administration did not develop a
coherent strategy to this end.
Instead, the U.S. Government pursued a Pakistan
policy, an India policy, and policies towards individual
Central Asian states. Although some progress has been
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made in encouraging the development of regional
transportation and electricity links in Central Asia, the
United States cannot hope to succeed in viewing the
region as an integrated whole if the countries concerned
fail to have such a vision themselves. Moreover, as was
noted in the first section of this monograph, the United
States pursues different priorities in relations with the
five Central Asian states.
U.S. policies towards Pakistan, India, and Central
Asian states also often work at cross-purposes. For
example, even as the priority of human rights concerns
declined in U.S. policies towards Central Asian states
since 9/11, in the case of Pakistan, U.S. support for
the authoritarian government of its long-time ally,
Pervez Musharraf, well after he lost the confidence of
pro-democracy segments of the Pakistani population,
undercut the entire premise of democratization as a
U.S. policy goal for Central and South Asia. Similarly,
the effort to encourage further U.S.-India cooperation
through a separate U.S.-Indian agreement on civilian
nuclear cooperation, despite India’s unwillingness
to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
undermines U.S. nonproliferation efforts elsewhere in
the region and outside.
Second, the United States needs to redress the
imbalance in aid to Central Asian states. Although
security assistance to the region is needed in support
of U.S. and NATO Afghanistan missions, regional
stability will not be achieved if greater efforts are not
taken to address regional development needs and
encourage accountable governance. The decline in
Freedom Support funding is particularly short-sighted
in this respect and more needs to be done to address
poverty, encourage the development of civil society,
and address social problems such as the environment
and public health.
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Third, the United States should work with its allies
in the EU and Japan to coordinate assistance and avoid
overlapping efforts. In July 2007 the EU announced
its “Strategy for a New Partnership for Central Asia”
and designated a Special Representative to the region,
Pierre Morel. Although the EU provided $2 billion in
aid (1.3 million euros) through the Technical Assistance
Program to the Commonwealth of Independent
States (TACIS) from 1991-2006, the new Central Asia
strategy raises funding substantially to $1.17 billion
(750 million euros) for 2007-13. The strategy involves
a series of dialogues on key areas of concern such as
human rights, the rule of law, education, trade, energy,
transport, and the environment.160 Although regional
cooperation will be encouraged, 70 percent of the funds
for 2007-10 will support bilateral assistance projects.161
Japan’s interest in Central Asia grew out of
former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s Eurasian
diplomacy initiative launched in 1997, which sought
primarily to reinvigorate Japan’s ties with Russia, while
promoting dialogue and cooperation with Central Asia
in a variety of areas. Since 2004, Japan has developed
a “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue to encourage
regional economic integration and has provided
bilateral aid through its “Silk Road Diplomacy.”162
Although Japan has given out some $2.5 billion in
humanitarian and economic aid to the Central Asian
states since the 1990s, some Western observers believe
that Japan’s main interest is in expanding its influence
in the energy sector, an area where investment is
likely to be more effective than aid but where the risky
investment climate creates significant entry barriers.163
Despite some differences in emphasis, the United
States, Japan, and the EU broadly share many of the
same priorities and face many of the same tradeoffs,
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especially achieving progress in human rights while
moving forward with energy diversification and
counterterrorism projects. Regular efforts to coordinate
initiatives on Central Asia would help promote more
consistent and effective policies.
Fourth, the United States should engage China in
dialogue on Central Asia, both to increase trust and
to address common concerns, especially narcotics and
human trafficking, proliferation of WMD, terrorism,
and stability in Afghanistan. The United States has
already been discussing Central Asia in subdialogue
discussions at the assistant secretary level. Central
Asia could be included in the context of other higher
level meetings, such as the Senior U.S.-China Dialogue
where regional stability issues often are raised, and
also the Strategic Economic Dialogue where energy
security already figures prominently on the agenda.
Although the United States and Russia have some
competing energy and security interests in Central
Asia, they have discussed related common concerns, for
example, through the U.S.-Russia Working Group on
Counter-Terrorism, the U.S.-Russia Energy Dialogue,
and the NATO-Russia Council. Addressing shared
interests, for example, in promoting energy efficiency
and conservation in Central Asia, preventing loose
nukes, and reducing narcotics and human trafficking
in Central Asia could be addressed in the context of
these bilateral meetings.
Before such dialogue can occur, the Obama administration needs to reevaluate its Russia policy and, once
such a review is concluded, speak with one voice to and
about Russia. Although the Russian invasion of Georgia
brought back unpleasant memories of Cold War era
confrontations, as Henry Kissinger and George Shultz
reminded us, while the United States needs to express
its concern about Moscow’s actions, “isolating Russia
51

is not a sustainable long-term policy.”164 Despite many
differences, President Obama will need to consider the
areas where cooperation with Russia continues to be
in American interests. Hasty retaliatory actions such as
a commitment to membership action plan for Georgia
and Ukraine to join NATO and the acceleration of
missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe should
be avoided until the Alliance fully thinks through
its security interests and the best ways of achieving
them.
Fifth, the United States should seek to engage the
SCO to improve its understanding of the organization
and encourage greater trust between its permanent
members and the United States. While some have
proposed establishing a relationship between NATO
and the SCO,165 this would serve to equate the SCO
with a military alliance, when its own members reject
this characterization. A Japanese scholar has suggested
a more promising approach which involves creating
an SCO plus alpha format,166 which could include the
United States, the EU, and Japan, perhaps to discuss
issues of particular concern, such as Afghanistan,
counterterrorism, or narcotics and human trafficking.
Another way for the United States to engage the
SCO is through the OSCE, particularly in the event
Kazakhstan assumes its leadership in 2010. The OSCE
and the SCO already have a limited relationship, and
the SCO has participated in a number of meetings on
counterterrorism in recent years.167 Nonetheless, the
OSCE and the SCO are at loggerheads over political
issues, such as election monitoring, which Russia
claims is biased. The Russian government has been
seeking to dilute the role of the OSCE by creating a
new Eurasian forum that would involve the SCO, the
CSTO, NATO, the EU, and the CIS.168
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Finally, the success of U.S. policies in Central Asia
depends on long-term changes in other policy areas. A
withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq without
seeking permanent basing options in the country, for
example, would add to the credibility of U.S. assertions
that its military presence in Central Asia is linked to the
security situation in Afghanistan. Similarly, a serious
effort by the Obama administration to reduce the U.S.
dependency on imported energy would enable the
United States to be more consistent in its political and
economic policies towards Central Asia.
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